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Summary  findings
This case study of Sulawesi's cocoa market is a  *  As a result of the competitive cocoa marketing
counterpoint to investigations of highly regulated  system, the farmgate price of cocoa in Indonesia is about
markets - agricultural and otherwise. The Indonesian  90 percent of the f.o.b. price - a much higher share
island's rapid expansion surprised the world cocoa  than cocoa produced in other countries and than other
market, especially because it came mostly from  commodities produced  in Indonesia. This relatively free
smallholders.  marketing and distribution system must be maintained
Akiyama and Nishio examined the smallholders'  for cocoa to develop further.
production  and marketing systems and the government  *  Some general government policies have benefited
policies implemented for smallholders to identify any  the cocoa subsector as well as others. Exchange rates
policy lessons that might be useful for other countries.  have been kept competitive, for example, no export tax
They found:  has been imposed, and it has been government policy to
- The following factors contributed to the rapid  build basic infrastructure in the outer islands.
expansion:  the availability of suitable land, low  Several issues must be addressed for cocoa to be
production  costs, a highly competitive marketing system  further developed: the quality of cocoa, the adding-up
(a result of the government's  hands-off policy or limited  problem  (export revenues not increasing in proportion  to
government interventions), relatively good transport  export quantities, because of the price-depressing effect
infrastructure, favorable macroeconomic policies, and  of increased exports), the recently imposed value-added
the smallholders' entrepreneurship.  tax, the cocoa pod-borer, export marketing, research,
* Until the recent imposition of a value-added tax,  retribution, local processing, environmental problems,
Indonesia's government left cocoa marketing and  and government interventions now being discussed for
distribution freer of government interventions than many  the cocoa sector.
other commodities - in part because the Indonesian  Government and industry must also resist the natural
Cocoa Association recommended such nonintervention.  temptation  for current players to become more
Other commodities were affected by direct involvement  conservative, to protect their interests.
of the National Logistics Agency, price controls, and
exclusive trade licensing requirements.
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Discussion of cocoa is offered as a counterpoint in a broader series of
investigations of highly regulated markets, within and outside the agricultural sector.
Indonesia's cocoa production has increased at a phenomenal rate in recent
years--at a compounded average rate of 26 percent p.a.  for the period 1980-94. This
rapid expansion surprised the world cocoa market, especially as the increase came mostly
from smallholders.  It would be useful and opportune to examine this subsector, to
evaluate if there are policy lessons for other producing countries, as well as for other
agricultural subsectors in Indonesia. This paper focuses on production and marketing
systems of and government policies implemented for the smallholders, since this is the
segment that underwent the largest expansion and is considered to be of the most interest
to the World Bank and to other developing countries. In particular, the paper discusses
the development of smallholder cocoa in Sulawesi.
The factors that contributed to the large expansion include availability of
suitable land, low production cost, a highly competitive marketing system resulting from a
"hands-off policy" or very limited direct government interventions, relatively good
transport infrastructure, favorable macroeconomic policies, and the entrepreneurship of
smallholders.
Lack of government interventions in marketing/distribution is a focus of
the study, as the case of cocoa in this respect is markedly different from many other
agricultural commodities in Indonesia. The Government of Indonesia (GOI) has left the
marketing/distribution of the subsector relatively free of major government interventions
(until the recent imposition of a value added tax), as compared with many other
commodities which are affected by various government measures such as direct
involvement by the National Logistics Agency (BULOG), price controls, and exclusive
trade licensing requirements. Suggestions and advice provided by the Indonesian Cocoa
Association (ASKINDO) appear to have contributed significantly to this policy. As a
result of fierce competition in the marketing system, the share of cocoa farmgate price in
f.o.b. price is one of the highest among Indonesia's major export commodities--around 90
ipercent in South Sulawesi. This is considerably higher than cocoa produced in other
countries as well as other commodities produced in Indonesia.  It is clear that, after
comparing the marketing system of these commodities, cocoa smallholder producers have
benefited greatly from the competitive marketing system.
Some GOI policies, not directed specifically to the cocoa subsector, have
been instrumental.  As part of GOI's program to promote non-oil exports, exchange rates
have been kept competitive and no export tax has been imposed, greatly benefiting the
export sector including cocoa. Furthermore, GOI's policies of building basic
infrastructure in the Outer Islands have supported  the cocoa subsector's growth.
In spite of the expansion of the subsector, there are several issues that need
to be addressed to foster its further development. These include quality of cocoa, the
adding-up problem (a situation wherein export revenue does not increase in proportion to
export quantity, due to the price depressing effect of increased export quantity), the cocoa
pod-borer, export marketing, research, retribution, local processing, and the environment.
Maintaining the relatively free marketing/distribution  regime is critically important for
future development of the subsector, and the subsector's growth prospects can be
enhanced by removing the import tariff on cocoa beans and finding alternative financial
sources for retribution now charged in some regencies. The recently imposed value added
tax on cocoa beans is worth examining, and various government interventions now being
discussed (e.g., export ban on cocoa beans with more than 20 percent unfermented beans)
should be carefully reconsidered.
As an industry matures, some of the existing players might be tempted to
become more conservative, to protect their interests. There could be such a tendency in
Indonesia's cocoa subsector as the above issues are addressed. The Central and Provincial
Governments, as well as the industry, should be wary of such tendencies and exert efforts
to keep the subsector competitive and free of government interventions.
iiIntroduction
The expansion of Indonesia's cocoa production in recent years has been
phenomenal;  during the period 1980-1994, annual production increased at a compounded
average rate of 26 percent p.a. from 10,284 tons to 271,127 tons.  Indonesia is now the
world's third largest cocoa producer after Cote d'Ivoire and Ghana.  Exports of cocoa
beans reached US$166 million in 1993, making it one of Indonesia's major agricultural
exports.  This rapid expansion took the world cocoa market by surprise. There are two
notable features with this expansion: that the engine of this growth has been the
smaliholders, and that the farmers have come to enjoy a high proportion of returns from
cocoa exports.
There are two intriguing questions which emanate from the recent
subsector performance.  First, what made this rapid, smallholder-based expansion
possible, and are there any policy lessons for other cocoa-producing countries?  Second,
in the context of the Bank's ongoing work of advising GOI in further deregulating the
Indonesian economy, are there policy lessons to be derived for other agricultural
commodities, particularly with regard to marketing and distribution aspects, which for
cocoa have been relatively free from government interventions, compared with many
other agricultural commodities in Indonesia?
The objectives of this paper are: (a) to analyze the production, marketing
and pricing systems for smallholder cocoa, with the focus on marketing/distribution; (b)
to examine government policies that have affected the subsector; (c) to identify and
evaluate issues presently faced by the subsector; and (d) to recommend policies that
would foster further development of the subsector in the future.1.  Production.  Marketing  and Distribution  Systems
Indonesia's cocoa producers can be classified into three categories:
smallholders, private estates, and government-owned estates (PTPs).1 About 80 percent
of the incremental production in the last 10 years came from the smallholders.  As a
result, their share in the total production increased from 10 percent in 1980 to 27 percent
in 1985 and 72 percent in 1994. The flow of cocoa through the marketing channels is
given as a flow-chart in Figure 1. Although PTPs are state-owned and hence their
production and marketing are controlled by GOI, the smallholder's production and
marketing systems are essentially free from government interventions.  Most cocoa beans,
approximately 80 percent in recent years, are exported and the rest are sold to local
grinders or industries.  There are substantial exports of cocoa products by these local
grinders.
A.  Production  System
Cocoa plants were introduced to Java early in the 18th century, and by
1930 production was around 1,500 tons.  Cocoa was mainly produced by plantations in
East Java, owned by Dutch companies and consisted of fine or flavor cocoa, in contrast to
bulk cocoa, which Europeans appreciated.  From an early date these cocoa plantings were
very seriously affected by the cocoa pod-borer (acrocercops cramerella). This pest was
found in cocoa in East Java and, as a result, cocoa cultivation in the region was
abandoned in 1936. The Dutch estates in West Java were not affected by this pest, but
were effectively neglected during and after World War II, such that production remained
marginal until the early 1980s. Although smallholder cocoa was produced in Maluku,
Sulawesi and other islands, the total smallholder production was only 1,058 tons in 1980.
In contrast  to the smallholder  sector,  Government  interventions  in PTP's production  and marketing
practices  are considered  to be heavy. This  appears  to be a major  reason  for PTP's inefficiency.
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3Following the high world cocoa prices in the late 1970s and early 1980s
prompted by a sharp reduction in output from West Africa, the mid-1980s saw a
phenomenal expansion in cocoa acreage and production by Indonesian smallholders,
mostly in the island of Sulawesi.  Total smallholder acreage expanded nearly 30-fold
between 1980 and 1994; from 13,125 ha in 1980 to 389,946 ha in 1994, and total
smaUholder production increased from 1,058 tons  to 196,235 tons during the same
period (see Figure 2, and Annexes 1 and 2).  This large production increase took place
mainly in the island of Sulawesi, which accounted for 77 percent of total smallholder
production in 1994. The provinces of South and Southeast Sulawesi are the major
producers, supplying 40 percent and 28 percent of the total output, respectively, in 1994.
Ruf  (1993a) of CIRAD cites the following factors that contributed to this
phenomena:
(i)  low cost of labor;
(ii)  abundance of suitable land;
(iii)  benefit of proximity to Malaysia;
(iv)  highly competitive marketing network in Sulawesi;
(v)  aid policy for development in this sector, and
(vi)  extensive coconut plantations ready to receive cocoa trees as
intercrop.
Apart from the factors above, which are discussed in some detail below,
there is another important factor that contributed to the smallholders' large production
expansion: the entrepreneurial and innovative skills of the smallholders, many of whom
are Bugis, a people with its origin in South Sulawesi. A large number of Bugis went to
work in plantations in Sabah, Malaysia, in the late 1970s and 1980s, partly because of its
proximity and the need for labor.  While working in these plantations, they not only
acquired the know-how to grow cocoa very efficiently, 2 but also acquired some capital.
2 Plantations in Sabah have invested heavily in agronomic research and their yields are the highest in the
world.
4Figure  2: Cocoa  Production  and Acreage  In Indonesia,  1980-1994
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Figures for 1994 are preliminary.The number of those who returned to Sulawesi and started cocoa farming
is considered to be small.  However, the dissemination of know-how and the remittance
of capital from Sabah to Sulawesi are considered to have had a great impact on the
expansion of cocoa production in Sulawesi.  Also, the smallholders probably have
benefited from the supply of seeds from PTPs and private plantations, which started
expansion of cocoa production in the late 1970s and early 1980s, many of which were
under the Government's estate crop projects. Initially, the smallholders planted cocoa in
South Sulawesi, but later many moved to Southeast Sulawesi (except Pakue in Southeast
Sulawesi where cocoa had been grown for a long time), where land was more abundant.
(Population density is estimated to be 5/ha in Southeast Sulawesi, much lower than in
South Sulawesi with 200/ha.) They often sold their farms and houses in South Sulawesi
to invest in Southeast Sulawesi, where they tended to grow cocoa on a monocultural
basis. 3
Judging from the locations where smallholders expanded their production
in Sulawesi, an important contributing factor has been relatively good transport
infrastructure.  For an export crop like cocoa, transport infrastructure is essential.  In
many areas where smallholder expansion took place, adequate roads or ports or both are
available.  Infrastructure investments by the Central and Proyincial Governments, some
through the Transmigration Programs, were also important factors which contributed to
the cocoa expansion.
With innovative and efficient production methods, coupled with the low
cost of labor as well as suitable climate and soil, the cost of production of Indonesian
smallholders is one of the lowest in the world.  This is one of the most important reasons
why Indonesia's  smallholders have been able to expand cocoa production at a very high
rate in spite of declining world cocoa prices in the 1980s and early 1990s in U.S. dollar
terms. Table I shows estimates of production costs as well as marketing costs and taxes
in major cocoa producing countries, including Indonesia.  As can be seen from Table 1,
3 Older farms apparently tend to do more mixed culture.  For instance, Jamal and Pomp (1993) reports that
the majority of cocoa-producing smallholders surveyed in the regencies of Mamuju and Polewali in
South Sulawesi were performing mixed culture.
6Indonesian smallholders are estimated to have enjoyed the lowest cost on leaving the
country, thanks to low production and marketing costs.
Table 1: Comparison of Rural Wage, Cost of Production, and Cost on Leaving
Country in Major Cocoa Producing Countrie,s
C6te d'lvoire  Ghana  Nigeria  Cameroon  Malaysia  Indonesia  Brazil
Pen.  Sabah
aily Wage (US$)  3-3.5  1-1.5  1-2  3.5-4  4-6  3-4  1.5-2  1-1.5
roduction Cost  0.66  0.48  0.50dl  0.83  0.7  1.3  0.3-0.8  1
(US$/kg)
larketing Cost (US$/kg)  0.50a  0.47c1  0.25"  0.61P  0.25"v  0.259  0.1111/  0.20e
axes and Levies  - 0.05  0.06  - - -0.3
(US$/kg)
ost on Leaving Country  1.16  0.95c'  0.80  1.50  0.95-1.55W  0.95-1.55s  0.41-0.91"'  1.55
(US$/kg)
ote:
Official scale plus estimated operating cost of the Caisse de Stabilisation.
Abolition of levies of 100.5 CFAF/kg in 1989.
Under the Marketing Board System, the State takes the whole of the difference between marketing costs and State price and producer price. It is
difficult to determine the difference between marketing costs and State levy.  It cannot be excluded even that the State would lose money if the
Board's real operating costs exceed US$0.50/kg with the world price at US$1/kg at the end of 1989.
Having averaged US$1.5/kg in 1988/89.
Estimate based on the study of Cote d'lvoire activity.
Including the expenses of SODECAO, the extension services.
According to estimates by F. Ruf (1990) in Sulawesi.
According to estimates by F. Jarrige (1989).
Arbitrary value, taking account of the openness of the system, geographical concentration and the standard of living of traders.
This is 30.8 percent of the F.O.B. value, taken here to be equal to the world price, i.e. around US$1/kg at the end of 1989. Temporarily lower in
December 1989.
aurce: Francois Ruf (1993b).
The impact of profitability of tree crops on their production is significant,
and Akiyama and Trivedi (1987) analyzed this issue theoretically and empirically. In the
case of Indonesia's  smallholder cocoa subsector, a slowdown in the rate of area
expansion in the last few years (See Figure 2 and Annex 2) is attributable, to a great
extent, to declining real cocoa prices.  (Farmgate cocoa prices in real terms in 1993 were
less than  half of the level that prevailed in the mid-1980s).
7B.  Marketing  and Distribution  System
In contrast to the marketing board system implemented in many African
cocoa producing countries (see Varangis et al, 1990), Indonesia has a basically free
marketing and pricing system.  The free-market system, as Duncan and Jones (1993)
discusses, is considerably more efficient than the marketing board system, such as those
in Ghana and C6te d'Ivoire.  Under the government-administered pricing system, there is
little incentive for monopoly/monopsony marketing organizations to be efficient.  Unless
scrutiny is extremely tight, costs are likely to increase. This is because the administered
pricing system tends to benefit particular groups within a country at the expense of
farmers, and also because of the inherent difficulties in managing administered prices.
Also, administered prices do not transmit market signals correctly and cause distortions in
resource allocation.
Statistical analysis was undertaken to examine the relationship between
f.o.b. prices at Ujung Pandang and world prices (ICCO Indicator Price).  The results
show, as illustrated in Figure 3, that the two price variables are very closely correlated
(regression analysis showing R2 of 0.99 for the period 1985-1993, for the original prices
as well as log of the prices), suggesting competitive pricing of cocoa in Ujung Pandang.
The absolute difference between the two prices fluctuated between US$0.30 and US$0.40
per kilogram for the period.
8Figure  3  Movements  of f.o.b. Ujung  Pandang  Prices
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As shown in Figure 1, smallholders sell their cocoa either to village
collectors (pengumpul), middlemen (pedagang), exporters, cooperatives, or estates--the
first two being the most common.  Co'lectors and middlemen do not need licenses or
permits for their business.  Most of the village collectors are themselves cocoa farmers,
and collect cocoa from other cocoa farmers in the same village to sell to middlemen.
Middlemen are generally merchants often engaged in other businesses, such as managing
general retail shops in villages.  They buy cocoa from farmers and collectors, arrange with
transport operators to move the cocoa to major ports, and deliver it to exporters.
Competition among collectors and middlemen is considered to be fierce.
Farmers often sell to several collectors, and change collectors depending on prices
offered.  Similarly, collectors often change the middlemen they sell to, and middlemen
change exporters.
Virtually all cocoa produced in South and Southeast Sulawesi is exported
from Ujung Pandang, the provincial capitol of South Sulawesi.  There are about 100
exporters in Indonesia, of which 64 operate in Ujung Pandang.  Out of these, 20 exporters
supplied about 92 percent of total cocoa exports from Ujung Pandang in 1990. Almost
all of them belong to ASKINDO, the Indonesian Cocoa Association.
The flow of money is the reverse of the physical flow of cocoa.  Exporters
usually provide credits to middlemen, who use cash to pay collectors and farmers.
9Price information is made widely available.  Information on prices in the
New York Exchange is transmitted through CB radio by ASKINDO to all exporters, who
in turn transmit them to middleman and collectors.  The Provincial Government of South
Sulawesi transmits the cocoa prices prevailing in Ujung Pandang via regular radio
bulletins.  Further, farmers have listened to BBC radio broadcasts (in the Indonesian
language) of cocoa prices over the past decade.
A salient feature of the cocoa subsector in Indonesia is that farmers receive
a very large proportion of the export revenue, compared with either cocoa produced in
other countries (Table 2) or other commodities produced in Indonesia (Table 3).  The
farmers' share of f.o.b. prices has now reached around 90 percent in Sulawesi.  This
compares favorably with the average shares in other cocoa producing countries for the
period 1980-1988; Ghana (63 percent), Cameroon (52 percent) and C6te d'Ivoire (50
percent).  It should be noted that the shares were much higher in countries with a free-
market system, such as Brazil (84 percent) and Nigeria (82 percent), than the countries
with marketing boards.
Table 2: Comparison of Farmers' Share of f.o.b. Prices for Cocoa in Major
Producing Countries
Country  Farmers' Share  Marketing Boards
Indonesia  89%  No
Brazil  84%  No
Nigeria  82%  No
Ghana  63%  Yes
Cameroon  52%  Yes
C6te d'Ivoire  50%  Yes
Note: Indonesia's figure based on January 1995 data in South Sulawesi.  For all other
countries, averages during the period 1980-1988 were used.
10Farmers'  share of export prices for cocoa is also higher than those for
other agricultural commodities in Indonesia. In the province of South Sulawesi, the
average farmers' share of the f.o.b. price for cocoa was 89 percent in January 1995 (see
Table 3 and Annex 3), which was considerably higher than the shares for cashew nuts (78
percent), Arabica coffee beans (77 percent), and nutmeg (68 percent).4 The only
commodity which rivaled cocoa in this regard in South Sulawesi is Robusta coffee (92
percent), another deregulated commodity which is examined in a separate Bank study.  It
is worth noting that farmers' share of export prices for some commodities in certain areas
are significantly lower, such as cassava in Lampung where farmers only received 18
percent of the f.o.b. price in 1988.
Table 3: Comparison of Farmers' Share of f.o.b. Prices for Selected Export
Commodities from South Sulawesi in January 1995
Commodity  Farmer's Share
Cocoa beans  89%
Coffee beans (Robusta)  92%
Cashew Nuts  78%
Coffee beans (Arabica)  77%
Nutmeg  68%
Memo items:
Cassava (Lampung, 1988)  18%a
Cassava  (East  Java,  1988)  53%a'
Sugar (Indonesia, 1992/93)  47%b
Copra (Central Sulawesi, 1995)  73%
Source: Dinas Perkebunan, South Sulawesi
Footnotes:
a/ Source: CASER (1992). Calculated as share of farmgate price for
fresh cassava in export price for dried cassava. The margin
therefore includes cost of drying.
b/ As share of wholesale price and accounting for processing fee.
c/ Estimated by Bank mission in February 1995, assuming weight loss
of 10% through redrying by exporter.
4 It should be noted that the figures in Table 3 are the average based on cocoa from a number of locations,
some of which are several hundred miles from the export port of Ujung Pandang.
I1Three factors would explain this high farmers' share of export price for
cocoa: low marketing and distribution margins resulting from intense competition among
traders under a free trade regime; a relatively good transport infrastructure which has kept
transportation costs low in the major producing areas; and lack of large government levies
such as export taxes.
Low marketing/distribution margins have played the major role in
ensuring high farmgate prices. It is argued that the low margin is a reflection of an
efficient marketing/distribution regime, capitalizing on market forces particularly in terms
of fostering competition among traders and enabling farmers to deal equally with traders.
As can be seen from Table 3, the gross marketing/distribution margin for
cocoa, as residual of the farmers' share, was 11 percent of the f.o.b. price in South
Sulawesi in January 1995. This is considerably lower than Arabica coffee (23 percent),
cashew nuts (22 percent), and nutmeg (32 percent).  It should be pointed out that the f.o.b.
prices per kilogram of Arabica coffee and nutmeg at the time were higher than cocoa's by
3 times and 1.14 times respectively, suggesting that cocoa's relatively low gross
marketing/distribution margin is not merely an arithmetical result of its high value per
kilogram.
The efficiency of the marketing/distribution regime for cocoa and its
benefits to farmers become clearer when contrasted with the cases of other commodities,
for which inefficiencies in marketing/distribution are well known.  The case of dried
cassava (gaplek) produced in and exported from Lampung in Sumatra is an example of
monopsony/oligopsony situations and high transport cost, where the distribution margin
was estimated to be as high as 82 percent of the f.o.b. price in 1988 (CASER, 1992).
While the margin includes the cost of drying fresh cassava, it is much higher than in East
Java (47 percent).  In Lampung, the farmers in a given area can only sell to a very limited
number (often only one) of large traders/processors, in many cases under practices of
advance payment before harvest, and they are not even allowed to see the pricing process
including rafaksi (price deduction based on starch content, impurities content, etc.) and
weighing.  Transport costs are also high (reported to be 35-40 percent of the marketing
12margin), due to the bulkiness and perishability of cassava, and also to poor road
infrastructure.  Sugar is an example of heavy government intervention, where the
farmgate price (and the ex-mill price) is fixed by the government, and all sugar produced
by the mills is required to be sold to BULOG except in Sumatra and the Eastern Islands
where 50 percent and 75 percent of the output, respectively, can be sold directly to the
market.  The farmer's estimated share of the wholesale price (since sugar is not exported)
is only 47 percent (considering that on average 38 percent of the farmers' sugar output is
kept by the mills as processing fee), but more importantly farmers in major cane
production areas are obliged to grow cane by the government, although rice would
generally give higher returns (by 28 percent according to one estimate).  With copra in
Central Sulawesi, farmers receive advance payments before harvest from traders and
processors who have established long-term relationships with farmers (similar to the
dried cassava case in Lampung).  While the farmgate price is at 73 percent of the f.o.b.
price, reflecting the implied interest rate, it is still substantially higher than dried cassava
in Lampung, partly since its value per kilogram is much higher (by 8-9 times in 1994).
As mentioned earlier, coffee presents an interesting case.  After dismantling the export
quota system in 1989, gross marketing margins have been reduced from 30-40 percent to
8 percent, through increased competition. The above comparison of marketing systems
for different commodities is summarized in Table 4 below.
13Table 4:  Comparison  of  Marketing  Systems  for Selected  Commodities
in Indonesia
Commodlty  Selling  Optlons  for  Avallability  of Price  Government  Gross  Marketing Commodity  Farmers  Information  for Farmers  Interventons  Marglns/b
Cocoa  (S. Sulawesi)  Can choose  among  Prce information  readily  Retribution  charges  in  11% (50% i  SE
(case  of free  market)  a large number  of  available. Local prices  certain  regencies  and  Sulawesi  in 1980,
collectors,  who in turn  broadcast  locally.  World  10 percent  import  before  cocoa  boom)
sell to different  prices broadcast  by BBC  tariff. VAT  of 10 per-
middlemen.  Indonesian  service  and  cent has  been imposed
by  ASKINDO.  since April 1995.
Robusta  Coffee  Can  choose  among  a  Price  information  readily  De  facto  ban on export  8% (30-40%  in 1989,
(S.  Sulawesi)  large  number  of  available.  Local  prices  of low-grade  coffee.  just when export
(case  of free market)  collectors,  who  in turn  broadcast  locally.  World  (Export  quota  existed  quota  was being
sell  to different  middle-  prices  broadcast  by BBC  between  1981  and  dismantled)
men. During  the export  Indonesian  service  and  1989.) VAT  of 10
quota  period beans  by AEKI.  percent  has  been
eventually  sold  only  imposed  since
to exporters  with quota.  April 1995.
Dried  Cassava  In many  areas,  a small  Very  little  price  information Export  quota  for the  82% (reflects  price
(Lampung)  number  of (often  only  one)  available.  The  processes  European  market.  deduction,  cost  of
(case  of monopsony/  large  buyer/processors  of price  deduction  (rafaksi)  drying,  high
oligopsony  and high  exist  (oligopsony/  based  on starch  content,  transport  cost)
transport  cost)  monopsony).  Price  etc.,  and weighing  are
basically  determined  by  often  kept confidential.
the buyer.
Sugar  (Indonesia)  Can  sell only  to the  Farmgate  (provenue)  Heavy  interventions.  53% (including  38%
(case  of heavy  nearest  mill  in TRI/a  price  fixed  by GOI, and  Farmers  in TRI  areas  of the farmers'  sugar
govemment  areas,  at a price  fixed  announced  annually  at  obliged  to  plant  sugar  output kept by the
intervention)  by GOI. Farmers  not  the beginning  of next  cane (i.e.  cannot  plant  mills  as processing
receiving  TRI credit  years cane  planting  other  crops  with higher  fee)
can sell  to anyone  season.  retums,  namely rice).
at any price  (mostly  and to sell to mills  at
in upland  areas  in  fixed  prices. Mills  in
E. Java).  Java must  sell  all the
sugar  to BULOG  at
fixed  prices.  BULOG  is
also  the  sole  importer
of sugar,  and conducts
market  operations  to
keep  prices  at certain
_ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _  _ _  _ _ _  _ _  _ _ _  _ _ _  _ _ _  _ _ _  _ _  _ _  _ _ _ _ _  _  _ _ _  _ _ _  _  _ _ _ _  lev els.
Copra  (C. Sulawesl)  Most  copra  sold  to one  Little  price  information  Retribution  charges  27% (reflects  cost
(case  of long-term  trader/processor,  who  available.  in all regencies  of  the  of re-drying,  implicit
farmer/buyer  relation-  provides  advance  to the  province.  interest  on advance
ships based  on credit  farmer before  harvest.  payment)
advance)  The rest is sold  to spot
markets.
Notes:  /a  Smaliholder  Cane  Intensification  Program,  started  in 1975.
/b  Derived  from Table  3 above.
14Further, it can be argued that the efficiency of the marketing/distribution
regime for cocoa has improved markedly over time.  Ruf (1993c) reports the case of the
village of Lapai in Southeast Sulawesi, where middlemen's margins were reduced from
50-100 percent of producer prices to 4-10 percent during the period 1980-85, and margins
between producer prices and New York c.i.f. prices declined substantially on trend
between 1980 and 1991. In South Sulawesi, there is statistical evidence that the gross
marketing margins have been reduced in recent years, i.e., the steady increase of the
average farmers' share of  f.o.b. prices for the province as a whole, from 76 percent in
1985 to 92 percent in 1993 (see Figure 4).
There are two important points to be made about the fall in gross marketing
margins in recent years.  First, much of this margin reduction took place when real
farmgate prices were falling steeply (see Figure 4): the average farmgate price for South
Sulawesi in 1993, in real terms, was roughly half the level attained in 1987. This implies
that the margin in absolute terms has fallen even more steeply than that in percentage
terms.
Second, most of the fall in gross marketing margins can be attributed to
squeezing of trading margins, not to reduction in trucking costs from production areas to
Ujung Pandang.  According to an analysis of changes in transport costs from three major
cocoa producing areas in South Sulawesi (Mamuju, Luwu and Sidrap), based on the Road
User Cost Model, total vehicle operating costs were estimated to have declined by 3.7 to
11.4 percent in real terms between 1990 and 1992. During the same period, gross
marketing margins were reduced at a much higher rate, by 41 to 84 percent in real terms
in these areas.  See Annex 3 for future details.
15Figure 4: Farmers' Shaire  of Cocoa Export Prices on
Average for South  Sulawesi, 1985-93
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16A Bank mission was able to confirtii, during a visit to Sub-district
Ladongi, Kolaka Regency, in January 1995, that marketing/distribution margins accruing
to cocoa collectors, middlemen and exporters are indeed small, and that farmers are
clearly receiving a very high proportion of f.o.b. prices. Based on the estimate given in
Table 5, the gross marketing margin accruing between the farmgate in Ladongi and Ujung
Pandang in that area was 13 percent of the f.o.b. price, and about 10 percent when the
direct transport cost from Ladongi to Ujung Pandang is netted out.  The estimated gross
margin is slightly higher in Ladongi than the average for South Sulawesi; one possible
explanation might be the fact that cocoa production started earlier in South Sulawesi and
hence competition for cocoa beans is keener there.
These results provide an interesting contrast with the findings of Bennett
and Hasan (1993), which was also based on a field visit in the Kolaka Regency in mid-
1992. The gross margin between the farmgate and export prices was higher then, ranging
between 23 percent and 26 percent of the f.o.b. price.  The difference between the two
sets of figures may be partly a result of variations in the structure of the marketing chain:
the earlier report documents a longer marketing chain than the one found during the Bank
rnission. At the time of the BennettlHasan study, exporters in Ujung Pandang were
relying heavily on a chain of local traders to have cocoa delivered to Ujung Pandang,
since these exporters had just started to establish their representative offices in the Kolaka
Regency.  It is likely that margins have been squeezed through intensifying competition
among traders, as it appears to be happening in South Sulawesi.
17Table 5:  Estimated Marketing and Distribution Margins for Cocoa:
the Case of Sub-district Ladongi, Southeast Sulawesi in January 1995
Item  Cost/Margin (Rp/kg)
farmgate price  2,250
cost to collectors of collecting cocoa  20
and delivering to middlemen
net margin for collectors  30 a/
cost to middlemen of trucking cocoa from Ladongi  42
to exporters in Ijung  Pandang
(including loading, bean bags)
assorted levies on transport from  38
Ladongi to exporters in Ujung Pandang
(retribution of Rp. 23/kg charged by the
Kolaka Regency, village tax of Rp. 15/kg)
net margin for middlemen  40 a/
operational costs for exporters  85-140
(sorting, redrying, stocking, etc.) b/
net margin for exporters  25-80 a!
export price (f.o.b. Ujung Pandang)  2,585
Source: Bank staff estimates, based on interviews.
a/ Imputed residuals.
b/ According to Ruf (1993a).
Low cost of transporting cocoa from production areas to ports of
export is a major contribution made to the cocoa subsector by GOI through investment in
roads.  This is a big comparative advantage Indonesia enjoys over other major cocoa
producing countries such as Ghana and Nigeria.  One of the main reasons why C6te
d'Ivoire and Malaysia were able to expand their cocoa production rapidly in the 1980s
was good road infrastructure. In Sulawesi, cocoa production has expanded mostly in
18areas with good road and/or sealane (e.g. Pakue area in Southeast Sulawesi) access to
Ujung Pandang.  Lack of good road access and the resulting high transport cost have
prevented expansion of cocoa production in areas with poor road access, such as the
southwest corner of Southeast Sulawesi.  In South Sulawesi, the cost of transporting
cocoa from the major producing areas to Ujung Pandang was estimated to range from Rp.
30 to 120/kg, which amounted to only 1.4 - 4.6 percent of the f.o.b. price in January 1995,
although this is partly a result of cocoa's high value per kilogram (about 2.5 times higher
than copra for example).  In the Southeast Sulawesi case study presented above, the
transport cost amounted to 3.2 percent of the f.o.b. price.
19II.  Government Policies
There have been very limited government policies or actions aimed
specifically at helping and developing smallholder cocoa. However, macroeconomic
policies, especially the competitive exchange rate policy coupled with relatively low
inflation, are considered to have had a beneficial effect on export commodities, including
cocoa.  Also, GOI's investments in rural infrastructure in the Outer Islands, including
those under the Transmigration Program, contributed to the expansion of smallholder
cocoa.
As described above, GOI has left the marketing and distribution of cocoa
relatively free of government interventions, until the imposition since April 1, 1995 of a
value added tax (VAT).  (See more on this in the "Value Added Tax" section below).
There are no marketing boards, direct involvement of  BULOG in marketing or import,
price controls, export quotas or exclusive trade licensing requirements that affect a wide
range of agricultural commodities in Indonesia.  This has contributed to efficient
marketing systems for cocoa, with low marketing costs as described earlier.  The only
existing government intervention concerning cocoa, apart from the VAT, are the
'retribution"  charges levied by local governments in some areas, for instance in the
province of Central Sulawesi, 6 and an import tariff on cocoa beans of 10 percent.  The
absence of export taxes is a contrast to the policies followed in Cameroon, Ghana and
C6te d'Ivoire in the 1980s. Because these West African countries had a limited tax base,
the governments had to rely on export taxes for their revenues. ASKINDO has
contributed to the maintenance of the relatively free marketing and distribution system, by
providing GOI with suggestions and advice on cocoa policy.
5 The most extreme example of such government interventions would be the case of sugar, where marketing,
import and production are controlled by GOI.
6 In the regencies of Donggala, Toli-Toli and Banggai, retribution of Rp. 15/kg, Rp. 25/kg and Rp. 4-10/kg are
charged respectively on cocoa transport. These are daily rates, meaning the stated rate will be levied for
one day if cocoa passes through any number  of check points that day.
20One of the most effective policies GOI has undertaken which helped the
cocoa subsector, as well as other export subsectors, is its competitive exchange rate
policy (see Annex 4).  This compares with the situation in Francophone African
countries, including C6te d'lvoire  and Cameroon, where the exchange rate was
overvalued in the late 1980s and the early 1990s . As Schiff and Valdez (1992) argues,
such an overvalued currency is equivalent to imposing a tax on export commodities.  As
shown in Annex 4, Indonesia's currency in real terms through the 1980s was much more
competitive than that of Malaysia, C6te d'Ivoire and Cameroon 7 due mainly to
Indonesia's real devaluation in 1986. This is a result of Indonesia's competitive
exchange rate policy, as well as prudent macroeconomic policies which kept inflation
low.  Such policies kept Indonesia's production of cocoa competitive, and as for the same
world cocoa prices in nominal U.S. dollar terms, Indonesian real producer prices have
been considerably higher than in many other major producing countries.
Another GOI policy which helped the subsector was provision of
infrastructure in the Outer Islands.  Essential infrastructure such as roads and schools
were built in some rural areas of South and Southeast Sulawesi, sometimes under GOI's
Transnmigration  Program, which greatly helped the expansion of the cocoa area.
GOI's extension services provided some support to the smallholders.
During the first half of the 1980s. smallholders benefited to some extent indirectly from
extension services financed by the Central and Provincial Governments, for instance
under PRPTE--a tree crop rehabilitation program--which were aimed for PTPs and
private estates.  Cocoa seeds were supplied by PTPs and some large private plantations to
smallholders.  These programs were at the beginning financed by Provincial
Governments, notably that of South Sulawesi, followed by those of Irian Jaya, Southeast
Sulawesi, Central Sulawesi, and East Kalimantan (see Indranada, 1993).
Although the Central Government provided loans through state-owned
banks under a scheme called PBSN (National Large Plantation Development) in late 1989
7 Francophone  African  countries  had devalued  their  currency,  the CFA  franc.  in early  1994 by 50%.  This
should  increase  export  sector's  competitiveness  in these countries.  However,  it is too early  to analyze
the impact  of the devaluation  because  limited  information  on inflation  and taxes,  after  the devaluation,
is available  for these countries.  It should be noted  that a large real devaluation  in the mind-1980s
stopped  the declining  trend  of cocoa  production  in Ghana.  which was  in force  since  the early  1970s.
21and early 1990, under which interest was subsidized, this mostly benefited PTPs and
private plantations.  To help development of smallholder tree crops, the Ministry of
Agriculture launched a program in 1990 known as P2WK (Plantation Development in
Special Areas).  Under this program, GOI provided small grants to smallholders in
designated "special areas," in the form of reimbursement of land preparation and planting
cost, and provision of seedlings. The "special areas" were defined as areas where existing
government services are difficult to reach.
P2WK started in fiscal year 1990/91 and covered a number of tree crops.
Out of the total area covered by the program of 205,296 ha for the period 1990/91-
1993/94, 62,767 ha was cocoa. While cocoa covered more acreage than any other crops,
this amounted to only 5 percent of total smallholder acreage on average during 1990/91-
1993/94 (see Table 5).  Mainly because of a large expansion in smallholder cocoa, this
program was reduced drastically from FY94/95.
Although P2WK had the effect of expanding smallholder cocoa areas, it
was criticized for opening remote areas where transport infrastructure was not adequate.
Also, because of rather poor quality of soil and/or non-suitability of climate, productivity
under P2WK is generally low and cocoa produced is considered to be poor.
22Table 5:  P2WK Cocoa Program: FY90/91-FY93/94 (hectares)
Province  FY90/91  FY91/92  FY92/93  FY93/94  Total
D.I. Aceh  1,513  1,080  1,000  510  4,103
North Sumatra  10  1,196  950  500  2,646
West Sumatra  796  377  563  0  1,736
Bengkulu  465  585  252  250  1,552
Lampung  549  908  1,000  300  2,757
West Java  488  500  1,219  787  2,994
Central Java  2,100  335  165  200  2,800
D.I. Yogyakarta  3,500  610  860  0  4,970
East Java  400  750  518  771  2,439
West Kalimantan  0  160  497  125  782
East Kalimantan  1,048  500  607  1,259  3,414
Central Kalimantan  500  500  500  500  2,000
South Kalimantan  420  347  500  200  1,467
North Sulawesi  500  783  1,059  375  2,717
Central Sulawesi  450  800  1,012  563  2,825
Southeast Sulawesi  1,958  1,180  1,940  1,250  6,328
W. Nusa Tenggara  400  200  350  350  1,300
East Nusa Tenggara  700  671  1,621  1,000  3,992
Maluku  0  0  300  0  300
lrian Jaya  4,250  2.750  3,065  1,580  11,645
TOTAL  20,037  14,232  17,978  10,520  62,767
Source: Indranada, 1993.
23III.  Issues
As discussed in the previous two sections, Indonesia's cocoa subsector
expanded very rapidly during the last ten years.  However, the subsector faces several
issues that need to be addressed in order for it to maintain healthy growth.
The issues examined here are quality, the adding-up problem, the value
added tax, risk of pest damage (by the cocoa pod-borer), export marketing, research,
retribution, local processing and the environment.
A.  Ouality
Quality of Indonesia's cocoa, especially that produced by smallholders, is
an issue considered to be important by ASKINDO and GOI.  A large portion of cocoa
produced by smallholders is unfermented or partially fermented cocoa8--fermented for 1-
2 days instead of the 5 days needed to achieve the high-quality typical of cocoa from
Ghana and some other countries. 9 Although there is a certain market for unfermented and
partially fermented cocoa, it sells at a discount to fully-fermented cocoa, and there
appears to be a concern that the discount would become larger when Indonesia's
production of unfermented and partially fermented cocoa increases substantially in the
near future.
In the early 1980s, Indonesia's unfermented and partially fermented cocoa
was appreciated by certain cocoa processors and chocolate manufacturers in the United
States, as production of such cocoa declined in the Dominican Republic.  Because it takes
less time for farmers to process and because it was easy for the Indonesian exporters to
8  Much  of the world's cocoa  is traded  commercially  on contract  terms  with standards  of "Good  Fermented"
(up to 5 percent  unfermented/slaty  and 5 percent  of other  defects  permitted)  or "Fair Fermented"  (up
to 10 percent  of each defect  permitted).  Sulawesi  cocoa  often  has levels  of unfermented/slaty  beans  in
excess  of 10 percent. Most  West  African  cocoa  has zero levels  of unfermented  beans  on these  same
commercial  contracts.
9  Fermentation  is necessary  to ensure  the development  of full chocolate  flavor. It is not as essential  if the
beans are only to be used for extraction  of cocoa  butter. However,  unless  the extraction  method  is
such that it can extract  unusually  high  levels  of butter, processing  of unfermented  cocoa  is not
expected  to be profitable.
24export to the United States to replace cocoa from the Dominican Republic, Indonesia
increased its supply of unfermented and partially fermented cocoa.  A cocoa dealer in
partnership with a chocolate manufacturer in the United States built a processing factory,
in large part, to process Indonesia's unfermented and partially fermented cocoa, mainly
for the purpose of extracting cocoa butter.  This has enabled the United States to absorb a
large quantity of Indonesian cocoa.  Recent discounts of unfermented and partially
fermented cocoa against fully fermented cocoa of West Africa is about US$100/ton,
which is about 7 percent of the value.  Some in Indonesia seem to expect the discount to
increase in the future with the increase in Indonesia's production.
An idea which appears to be gaining support in Indonesia is to pass a
regulation which would prohibit exports of cocoa that contains more than 20 percent
unfermented cocoa.  This compares with the current situation where cocoa with any
percentage of unfermented beans can be exported. Although some consider this proposed
regulation to be cosmetic, because they believe that most cocoa exported by Indonesia at
present contains less than 20 percent unfermented beans, there are others who believe that
much of the cocoa exported from Sulawesi contains well over 20 percent of unfermented
beans.  Anyway, there are a few problems with the proposed regulation. Firstly, there is
no specific world market for cocoa which contains 20 percent or more unfermented
beans, while there are markets for fermented and for unfermented beans.  Thus, it might
be difficult to sell cocoa which contains 20 percent unfermented beans at any price
premium.  Secondly, it is questionable whether an efficient quality-control system can be
established to reliably evaluate the percentage of unfermented beans in any lot. Thirdly, it
would be much more efficient to let the market mechanism work, to encourage farmers
who are already producing fermented beans.  Although ASKINDO has been carrying out
campaigns to produce more fermented cocoa, little reliable and concrete information is
passed to farmers on the price premiums of fermented beans.  Judging from the behavior
of smallholder cocoa farmers in Indonesia, if enough information is given and when the
price differential widens in the future, they are likely to produce more fermented cocoa
without government regulations.  The proposed regulation could confuse farmers and
some exporters.  It should be noted that the fundamental quality problem for Indonesia is
25uncertain quality, rather than low quality grades (see Bennett et al 1993). Uncertain
quality is most efficiently addressed through market mechanisms, namely development of
buyer-seller relationships, rather than through regulatory controls.
Another idea for quality improvement which seems to be seriously
considered is the "rayonisasi" concept, i.e., formation of partnership between farmers and
exporters by assigning specific exporters to operate in certain geographic areas.  The
negative impact of this policy, if implemented, will be significant. The existing
competitive marketing/distribution regime would be undermined, and the share of
farmgate prices in export prices is likely to fall (cf. cases of cassava and copra in Table
4), which could result in decline of both quantity and quality of the cocoa produced.
At the moment, there are sufficient buyers of adequate quantities of the
partially fermented and unfermented Sulawesi cocoa. However, there also appear to be
an increasing number of buyers who are showing interest in fully fermented Sulawesi
cocoa - a type of cocoa which is currently produced in a few specific, limited localities in
various parts of Sulawesi.  Obviously such cocoa would have to be exported at a premium
price, and the majority of that premium would need to be passed back to the farmers, to
encourage them to produce increased quantities of fully fermented cocoa and to reward
them for their extra efforts.  When significant buyers of fermented cocoa show a
sustained demand at a premium price, then it is highly likely that exporters, middlemen
and farmers will respond to satisfy that demand by making sales/purchases at premium
prices at every stage in the marketing chain. This process will be assisted if there is
transparency, so that farmers know the expected premium for fully fermented cocoa.
One way of achieving transparency is to encourage the warehouse receipt
system.  (See below in the section "Export Marketing"). The warehouse receipt system is
an efficient and transparent system to obtain substantial quantities of better quality cocoa
with clear price differentials.  This should contribute, through market mechanism, to
quality improvement of Sulawesi smallholder cocoa.  Local radio broadcasts of prices of
fermented cocoa should also be effective.
26B.  Adding-up Problem
GOI is concerned that Indonesia's rapidly increasing cocoa production will
depress world cocoa prices, which would be detrimental to the welfare of Indonesian
cocoa producers.  Furthermore, because lower world cocoa prices would hurt other cocoa
producing countries, other producing countries are concerned about the future of
Indonesia's  cocoa production
The adding-up problem, i.e., the phenomenon where incremental
production of a commodity by a country or a group of countries results in an increase in
export revenue proportionally less than the volume (see Akiyama and Larson, 1994),
could become an important issue for Indonesia in the near future.
GOI might be tempted to impose an export tax to keep the future increase
of Indonesian cocoa production low.'0 However, given that the expansion of cocoa
production will increase employment in rural areas and farmers' income and that the
country's welfare changes only a little, GOI should not consider imposing the export tax.
Also, export tax often leads to other problems such as smuggling and corruption.  Further,
it should be noted that other policies such as production or export quotas would have
even more detrimental effects on the subsector than the export tax.
'° Theoretically, as discussed above, the country's welfare  (the sum of cocoa  farmers' producer  surplus  and
government's  tax revenues  from cocoa)  is maximized  in the short-  to  medium-term  by imposing  an
export tax at the optimal level, although the long-term effect is uncertain. However, Akiyama and
Larson (1994) show that the difference in welfare between the optimal export tax and zero tax cases is
very small.  Further, it should be noted that the producer surplus and export revenue from cocoa are
maximized when the export tax is zero, and that there is difficulty in eliminating or reducing the tax
when conditions warrant them. Although it may sound somewhat paradoxical, existing large
producers may support the export tax, due to the fear they might have that the size of price decline
caused by incremental production could be larger than the size of reduction in producer price caused
by the export tax. However, a simple economic analysis shows that existing producers will definitely
lose by the imposition of the export tax, unless the revenue from the tax is channeled back to them.
27C. Value Added Tax
Beginning April 1, 1995, a value added tax (VAT) of 10 percent has been
imposed on selected agricultural commodities, including cocoa, coffee, rubber and tea.
Although not much information was available on the past collection of VAT and current
plans to implement the new VAT policy as this paper was being prepared, there are
advantages and disadvantages to this new development which merit examination.
The advantage would be that the base for VAT would be broadened.  This
would be consistent with the fiscal objective of building a tax base which is broadly
spread across sectors and features relatively low rates.
The disadvantages would include the following. First, if the policy of
providing rebates on exports is maintained, imposing VAT on these commodities might
not be efficient from a tax collection point of view, due to the fact that collections would
have to be rebated anyway.  As stated earlier, about 80 percent of cocoa beans are
exported (with most of the remainder also exported as intermediate goods), implying that
VAT on most of Indonesia's cocoa would be rebated.  VAT for large amounts of rubber
and coffee exports would also need to be rebated; they were first and third in exported
value among non-timber agricultural commodities in fiscal 1993/94, accounting for US$1
billion and 0.4 billion, respectively.  The net incremental VAT revenue would therefore
be small, in comparison with the added cost of administering the new policy.  It might
make more sense, from the standpoint of tax collection efficiency, to raise tax revenue
from other sources than through VAT on commodities that are mainly exported.
Second, if such an added burden on VAT administration makes immediate
rebating difficult, payment of the VAT up front would add financial costs to exporters.  If
the wait for rebating is long, the new VAT would have an effect similar to an export tax,
which is probably neither an objective nor an intention of the new policy.
Third, the new policy could reduce incomes of smallholders who produce
over 70 percent of cocoa.  This would happen particularly when exporters incur added
financial cost as described above, and pass on such cost to smallholders.  Smallholders
also produce about 80 percent of rubber and 90 percent of coffee.  Small-
28scale agriculture, due to its lack of records and financial fragility, is one sector where
implementation of VAT has been difficult in other countries (Shoup, 1988).
D.  Cocoa Pod-Borer
The main reason for the decline or stagnancy in Indonesia's cocoa
subsector in the early 20th century was the cocoa pod-borer--an insect pest that reduces
yield drastically.  Detrimental impact of the cocoa pod-borer could be extremely serious
as no fundamental control measure is available, except eradication of affected cocoa
trees.  Application of certain chemicals has some effects.  However, this is very expensive
and needs to be done in a wide area for maximum effects, and its effectiveness is
uncertain. Further, control measures need to be taken at the same time with the
cooperation of every cocoa farmer in the area. Regular application of chemicals to reduce
the damage could increase the production cost substantially--some estimate production
cost could rise by about 30 percent.
Currently, the cocoa pod-borer is found in some parts of Central Sulawesi,
Maluku, and Kalimantan, but it has the possibility of spreading to major producing areas.
GOI and ASKINDO are aware of this problem, and have been undertaking research to
devise better control methods.  At present, it is not clear if or when the pod-borer will
spread more widely.  As it can potentially destroy the subsector, it is of utmost
importance to identify means to combat this pest.  ASKINDO is planning to use
biorationals on a pilot basis, but stronger GOI support would be needed for research,
extension and mobilization of the smallholders.  (See more on this below under
"Research").
E.  Export Marketing
At present, there seems to be sufficient competition among exporters,
judging from the number of exporters and the farmgate prices' share in export prices.
However, some exporters appear to oppose a recent proposal by a large foreign cocoa
29brokerage house to open a warehouse,  and plans by several firms to introduce a
warehouse receipt system.  Furthermore, not all exporters seem to be interested in
improving the quality of Sulawesi cocoa, but instead in retaining the status quo.
The planned warehouse operations by one of the world's biggest cocoa
brokerage firms is an attempt by the firm to obtain good quality cocoa from many
exporters.  Any exporter, under this system, can deliver cocoa to a warehouse in Ujung
Pandang, have the quality checked, and receive receipts which can be used as collateral
against loans.  The loan is provided by banks and warehouse operators.  This has the
advantages of increased liquidity and increased transparency of price differentials
depending on quality.  The warehouse receipt systems considered by other firms would
have the same effects.
The reasons why some exporters apparently oppose the warehouse
operations seem to be: (i)  loss of the advantage that the large exporters believe they have
in providing finance to middlemen and collectors; and (ii) loss of extra profits some
existing exporters seem to make by sorting cocoa by grades and selling sorted good
quality cocoa with premium, as they would be less able to do this with increased
transparency in price differentials.  Despite such possible opposition, GOI should
encourage operations of the warehouse receipt system.
A measure which could foster development of small operators is a legal
brokerage system which can handle risk management instruments. This might also
facilitate development of forward contracts, which at present might not be familiar to
small operators or not accessible to them due to lack of credit standings.  At present, there
are no regulations governing brokerage houses which can handle risk management
instruments such as futures and options.  This makes it difficult for small exporters and
middlemen to undertake these activities, while large exporters carry out these activities
through overseas brokers.  This is an issue that the Ministry of Trade is considering at
present.
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Agronomic research in cocoa is undertaken by the Coffee and Cocoa
Research Institute in Jember, East Java, while economic and marketing studies on cocoa
are carried out at the Agribusiness Studies and Development Center in Jakarta. The
funding of the research comes from the PTPs, Ministry of Agriculture (Agency for
Agricultural Research and Development), and money raised by the Research Institute
through selling planting materials.
One of the problems is that these research institutes have only limited
contact with ASKINDO.  This makes it difficult for the research institutes to tackle issues
such as quality improvement and the adding-up problem.  The administrative structure of
the research institutes would need to be examined, so they would undertake research
more relevant to the market situations.
Also, there are criticisms that the research institutions have been
undertaking research more relevant to big estates as they are partly financed by PTPs.
Judging from the recent developments of the subsector, it is evident that the smallholders
have been the engine of growth. They could benefit greatly from better infrastructure,
comprehensive extension services and research.
A topic that these research institutes need to tackle as a matter of priority
is the cocoa pod-borer.  The recommendation by the institutes was for eradication of
affected cocoa trees. This was opposed strongly not only by smallholders but also by
private estates, which resulted in a non-cooperative attitude of the growers toward the
research institutes.  Appropriate research on controlling the pest is desperately needed,
but if eradication is the only solution, it would not be a task to be handled only by the
research institutes.  Involvement of Governments, especially the Provincial ones, might
be necessary.
31G.  Retribution
A levy on a commodity, imposed at any point in the marketing/exporting
chain, will eventually be passed on to farmers through lower farmgate prices. The
Central Government has not imposed such a levy on cocoa, and there are no such charges
in most of the cocoa producing areas at the local regency level.  However, in some
regencies retribution is charged, and charges also exist at the lower (village) level in some
cases.  In the case of Ladongi described above, the total amount of regional charges is
roughly equal to the trucking cost.  In general, retribution and other trade charges distort
market price signals, effectively raise average production cost, squeeze producers'  profit
and reduce Indonesia's comparative advantage in the world market.
For cocoa, retribution amounts to a relatively small portion of export
prices.  However, retribution carries a nuisance value which discourages traders, and it
opens opportunities for various rent-seeking activities by those enforcing payment.
Hence, retribution and other trade charges on cocoa should be eliminated, and alternative
financial sources for Local Governments should be sought.
H.  Local Processine
There appears to be a strong interest within the cocoa industry towards
local processing of intermediate cocoa products such as cocoa butter, cake, powder, and
liquor.  However, in order to process cocoa to produce desirable quality cocoa products,
beans of certain quality from overseas sources are needed for blending, on which an
import tariff of 10 percent is imposed. Although 10 percent may seem small, the impact
of the duty is likely to be high enough to make imports almost prohibitive, given the
apparent small margin of the processors.  Elimination of the import duty would be an
important step towards enhancement of cocoa processing in Indonesia.
If appropriate standards of hygiene and technology are followed, local
processing should increase value-added for a certain tonnage. Because Indonesian cocoa
32is traded at a discount to West African cocoa, and because its butter is hard, cocoa
processing in Indonesia could be more profitable than in West Africa. However, it should
be noted that more local processing might not alleviate downward pressure on prices of
cocoa beans exported, unless local processing increases cocoa consumption in Indonesia.
This is because most of processed cocoa is exported and increased local processing will
result in reduced import demand for beans--the substitution effect.  It should also be
noted that processing facilities are very capital-intensive and actually create limited
employment.  Subsidies to promote local processing may have been discussed, but they
are unlikely to realize justifiable benefits for the reasons mentioned above.
I.  Environment
Although accurate land use information for cocoa producing areas is not
available, it is clear that much of the cocoa fields in Sulawesi were created by opening up
forests.  It is apparent that in most such cases, forest boundaries and land use plans were
not consulted.  Loss of forest areas, depending on the type of forests, carries the risks of
erosion, reduction of watershed areas and loss of biodiversity.
It is not easy to mitigate such risks. The difficulty of alleviating
deforestation, due to institutional constraints, lack of land use information and other
reasons, is documented in the Bank's reports on the environment in Indonesia (1990 and
1994). However, the above environmental risks deserve close attention, given the rapid
growth of cocoa growing areas.
There appear to be at least two steps that would help address the above
risks.  The first would be to direct expansion of cocoa areas towards relatively degraded
or underutilized land, instead of forest land.  Seven percent of Sulawesi's land was
classified as grassland, which was higher than Sumatra and Kalimantan with 4 percent
each (Whitten, Mustafa and Henderson, 1987). Further, it was estimated, based on 1986
data, that about 25 percent of South Sulawesi's land  (15,712 ha) and 21 percent of
Southeast Sulawesi's land (7,628 ha) can be classified as underutilized or poorly
managed, as they consist of grassland and bush/scrub (Regional Physical Planning
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underutilized lands have expanded since the time when the above data were collected.
While it may not be suitable to plant cocoa on very degraded lands (e.g., those with alang-
alang or Impereta cylindrica), there should be great scope to use relatively degraded lands
(e.g., scrubs on logged-over forests) productively and provide vegetative cover, through
cocoa planting.  New rural roads could be designed to encourage cocoa farming in such
relatively degraded areas, rather than forested areas. The estate crop extension officers at
the provinces (Dinas Perkebunan Rakyat) should take the initiative in guiding the farmers
and disseminating the technology needed to plant cocoa on such lands.
The second would be to identify and demarcate the most vulnerable forest
areas which are both vulnerable (since they are lying just outside major existing and
growing cocoa producing areas) and valuable (for watershed, biodiversity or other
reasons).  The Provincial and Local Governments, together with the local people, would
be best suited to conduct this task, and the Ministry of Forestry staff should surely be
involved.  Efforts should be made to keep cocoa expansion out of protection and
conservation forests.
In the longer term, the Spatial Plans now being prepared by the Provincial
and Local Governments should clearly identify and demarcate the environmentally fragile
or valuable areas that need to be protected in the respective regencies.  Economic
incentives to discourage farmers from opening up forest land should also be devised.
34IV.  Conclusion and ProsDects
The rapid expansion of Indonesia's cocoa production in the last 10 years
was mainly due to large production increases by the smallholders in South and Southeast
Sulawesi.  While the climate and soil in Sulawesi as well as the entrepreneurial attitude of
the smallholders were vital for this development, the relative lack of government
interventions in marketing/distribution (especially until the recent imposition of VAT),
prudent macroeconomic policies and provision of good infrastructure were also very
important.  The relative lack of government interventions deserves special attention, since
the resulting marketing/distribution regime for cocoa is markedly different from that of
many other agricultural commodities in Indonesia where government interventions exist
in various forms.  ASKINDO's advice and suggestions have contributed to this.  The
benefits to cocoa farmers are clear.  Maintaining this marketing/distribution policy for
cocoa is critically important for future development of the cocoa subsector, and the
subsector's growth prospects can be enhanced by removing the import tariff on cocoa
beans and finding alternative financial sources for retribution now charged in some
regencies. Further, the various interventions currently under discussion should be
carefully reconsidered.
Increased cocoa production has resulted in increased exports, and cocoa is
now one of Indonesia's main export commodities. This has also created employment and
increased income in rural areas, and thus contributed to development of rural areas in
Sulawesi.  Judging from new plantings underway and maturing of recently planted trees.
the expansionary trend of the last ten years is likely to continue for at least the next 5
years.  However, there are several issues which should be addressed by the subsector in
order to maintain its healthy growth.
One of GOI's main concerns is the negative effect on prices of rapidly
increasing production.  It is well-known that as the world market share of a country
increases, the country will face the adding-up problem.  However, in the case of
Indonesia, the problem is not likely to become serious for a long time.  Even in the event
the problem does become serious, GOI should not impose measures, such as an export
35tax, to discourage cocoa production because the negative effects of such measures are
likely to far outweigh the benefits, especially in the long run.
Another major concern of GOI is quality improvement. The most
effective means of improving quality is to provide incentives to producers through price
differentials, for instance through the warehouse receipt system as it would make the
price differentials more transparent.  Instruments now under discussion, namely the
export ban on low-grade cocoa and "rayonisasi," are likely to be ineffective in terms of
improving quality.  Further, these instruments could undermine the market forces which
have fueled the growth of cocoa.
Some exporters' concern with regard to the warehouse receipts system and
to proposed actions to improve quality through  transparency in price differentials might
be coming from the intention to protect their existing interests.  Often an industry benefits
from a free market while it is expanding, but once it matures, the industry's players tend
to become conservative to protect gained interests. It is imperative to keep the subsector
free of government interventions if it is to maintain its vigor and growth. If any problems
need to be addressed, market incentives should be used to the maximum extent possible.
The cocoa pod-borer is an extremely serious problem and, if it spreads out
of control, it could decimate the subsector. The problem is difficult to solve, especially in
the smallholder sector.  At this stage, as a necessary first step, a comprehensive survey to
determine the extent of infestation needs to be undertaken. This is an area where
Government's involvement, both at the central and regional levels, could be beneficial.
Although the World Bank expects world cocoa prices to increase for the
next 10 years (See World Bank 1995), the pace of Indonesia's cocoa production growth
in the future could slow down substantially. Apart from the cocoa pod-borer problem, the
major problem is lack of additional land with suitable soil and climate, and good transport
access. Probably, the most important policy considerations in maintaining adequate
growth of the subsector are, apart from implementation of effective measures to combat
the cocoa pod-borer, provision of transport infrastructure and extension services in
suitable areas, as well as keeping the subsector free of government interventions.
36Annex 1: Production of Cocoa by Region and Type, 1980-1994
(in tons)
Sulawesi  Java  Others  Total
Small-  Public  Private  Small-  Public  Private  Small-  Public  Private  Small-  Public  Private  All
holders  Estates  Estates  holders  Estates  Estates  holders  Estates  Estates  holders  Estates  Estates  Types
1980  n.a.  n.a.  n.a.  n.a.  n.a.  n.a.  n.a.  n.a.  n.a.  1,058  8,410  816  10,284
1981  n.a.  n.a.  n.a.  n.a.  n.a.  n.a.  n.a.  n.a.  n.a.  1,437  10,429  1,271  13,137
1982  n.a.  n.a.  n.a.  n.a.  n.a.  n.a.  n.a.  n.a.  n.a.  3,787  11,464  2,009  17,260
1983  n.a.  n.a.  n.a.  n.a.  n.a.  n.a.  n.a.  n.a.  n.a.  5,401  11,738  2,501  19,640
1984  2,656  - 215  14  10,290  1,106  3,559  6,271  2,391  6,229  16,561  3,712  26,502
1985  4,567  - 220  9  12,172  1,161  4,421  4,389  2,908  8,997  16,561  4,289  29,847
1986  6,425  - 561  23  9,160  1,090  5,313  9,128  2,837  11,761  18,288  4,488  34,537
1987  17,610  - 588  73  8,939  1,356  8,158  8,719  4,756  25,841  17,658  6,700  50,199
1988  21,751  - 534  34  9,826  1,088  8,889  8,719  4,589  30,674  18,545  6,211  55,430
1989  17,181  - 566  85  10,520  1,293  9,926  9,580  4,730  27,192  20,100  6,589  53,881
1990  79,212  - 935  206  12,241  2,831  18,060  14,775  14,147  97,478  27,016  17,913  142,407
1991  96,004  - 1,099  226  14,116  2,957  22,180  16,495  16,162  118,410  30,611  20,218  169,239
1992  114,159  61  1,290  776  14,113  3,786  30,628  21,819  20,515  145.563  35,993  25,591  207,147
W  1993  144,635  75  1,340  1,916  17,146  3,918  40,978  23,417  24,534  187,529  40,638  29,792  257,959
1994\a  151,185  75  1,381  1,994  16,942  4,210  43,056  25,105  27,179  196,235  42,122  32,770  271,127
Sources: Directorate General of Estates; ASKINDO.
Footnote:  \a Preliminary data.
Note:  n.a. = not available.Annex 2: Acreage of Cocoa Production by Region and Type, 1980-1994
(in hectares)
Sulawesi  Java  Others  Total
Small-  Public  Private  Small-  Public  Private  Small-  Public  Private  Small-  Public  Private  All
holders  Estates  Estates  holders  Estates  Estates  holders  Estates  Estates  holders  Estates  Estates  Types
1980  n.a.  n.a.  n.a.  n.a.  n.a.  n.a.  n.a.  n.a.  n.a.  13,125  18,636  5,321  37,082
1981  n.a.  n.a.  n.a.  n.a.  n.a.  n.a.  n.a.  n.a.  n.a.  14,869  20,678  7,422  42,969
1982  n.a.  n.a.  n.a.  n.a.  n.a.  n.a.  n.a.  n.a.  n.a.  18,000  23,308  7,121  48,429
1983  n.a.  n.a.  n.a.  n.a.  n.a.  n.a.  n.a.  n.a.  n.a.  25,858  25,132  8,938  59,928
1984  18,355  - 1,038  214  17,665  2,407  20,648  10,002  8,190  39,217  27,667  11,635  78,519
1985  26,999  - 944  140  18,658  3,106  24,626  10,540  7,784  51,765  29,198  11,834  92,797
1986  31,394  - 1,040  224  19,171  2,679  26,966  10,823  8,736  58,584  29,994  12,455  101,033
1987  66,695  - 850  1,031  22,734  3,691  47,196  15,657  13,972  114,922  38,391  18,513  171,826
1988  72,952  - 723  1,173  24,633  3,595  52,816  15,660  14,615  126,941  40,293  18,933  186,167
1989  62,847  - 748  1,408  26,162  3,829  55,384  15,671  15,963  119,639  41,833  20,540  182,012
1990  143,330  250  2,255  8,294  27,414  7,660  100,613  30,246  37,738  252,237  57,910  47,653  357,800
co  1991  147,869  263  4,821  8,627  27,943  7,719  103,720  31,167  42,765  260,216  59,373  55,305  374,894
1992  193,194  1,595  5,754  21,568  31,969  10,508  137,149  28,873  65,396  351,911  62,437  81,658  496,006
1993  201,263  1,906  6,937  22,829  32,409  11,652  152,814  31,210  74,535  376,906  65,525  93,124  535,555
1994 \a  203,399  1,906  6,888  26,317  34,804  12,065  160,230  31,841  80,552  389,946  68,551  99,505  558,002
Sources: Directorate General of Estates; ASKINDO.
Footnote: \a Preliminary data.
Note: n.a. = not available.Annex 3
Role of Transport Cost in Determining
Cocoa Farmeate Prices
As mentioned earlier, availability of good transport infrastructure has played a
critical role in smallholder cocoa development, as can be seen from the fact that most
major producing areas in Sulawesi have good road or sealane access to Ujung
Pandang. In order to better understand the role which improved transport played in
the recent reduction of gross marketing margins, an attempt was made in this study to
assess the extent to which farmgate prices are determined by transport cost, based on
data collected in South Sulawesi for its major production areas.
The data show that the variation in transport cost, based on differences in both
distance and road quality, plays a part in determining farmgate prices as shown in the
attached  table and figure.  For instance, the difference in distance is reflected in the
farmgate price differential between Sidrap and Luwu regencies, situated along the
same road going northeast from Ujung Pandang but whose respective major towns,
Sidenreng  and Palopo, are 157 km and 234 km away from Ujung Pandang by road,
respectively (see Map of Sulawesi). Farmgate prices in Sidrap have been generally
higher than in Luwu, with the difference ranging between 2 percent in 1993 and 20
percent in 1990 (see attached figure and table).  However, transport cost appears to
be only one of numerous factors that determine farmgate prices.  For instance,
according  to the Road User Cost Model, the trucking cost (using the total estimated
vehicle operation cost for 12-ton trucks) for the longer Palopo-Ujung Pandang route
was estimated to be Rp. 16.2/kg in 1990, as compared with Rp. 11.0/kg for
Sidenreng-Ujung Pandang.  During this year, the average farmgate prices for the two
regencies concerned were Rp. 1,255/kg and Rp. 1,500/kg respectively, meaning that
the transport cost differential accounted for only 2 percent of the farmgate price
differential. There seem to be other forces that determine farmgate prices, such as
the degree of traders' competition for beans, the farmers' bargaining power, the
efficiency of bean collection and the access to main roads from producing areas.
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The difference in road quality also has some influence on farmgate price differential.
This can be examined by analyzing farmgate prices in the regency of Mamuju, whose
central town by the same name is 402 km away from Ujung Pandang by road,
including 142m of very poor road between the towns of Majene and Mamuju (its
weighted average International Roughness Index being 10.1 rm/km  in 1993,
compared with 3.7 rnkm  for the rest of the way to Ujung Pandang). The cost of
transporting cocoa on this poor road is higher than the cost for transporting on good
roads, by as much as 100 percent according to an exporter.  This has kept farmgate
prices in Mamuju generally below the levels of Luwu and Sidrap (see attached
figure). However, the transport cost differences account for a relatively small part of
the farmgate price differential, also in this case. The trucking cost for the Mamuju-
Ujung Pandang route was estimated, also using the Road User Cost Model, to be Rp.
30.8/kg in 1990, when the average farmgate price for Mamuju was Rp. 1,225/kg. In
other words, transport cost differential explained about half of the farmgate price
differential between Mamuju and Sidrap.
Cocoa Farmgate Prices, for Selected Regencies
in South Sulawesi
YEAR  Average  Farmgate  Prices  (Rplkg)  FOB Price
By Regency  Pandang
Luwu  Mamuju  Sidrap  (Rp/kg)
1985  1,575  (75%)  1,525  (73%)  1,625  (78%)  2,094
1986  1,561  (70%)  1,550  (69%)  1,750(78%)  2,241
1987  1,835  (71%)  1,800  (70%)  2,100  (43%)  2,587
1988  1,472  (72%)  1,425  (69%)  1,700  (83%)  2,051
1989  1,361  (78%)  1,325  (76%)  1,500  (86%)  1,735
1990  1,255  (74%)  1,225  (73%)  1,500  (89%)  1,687
1991  1,504  (84%)  1,370  (76%)  1,500  (84%)  1,794
1992  1,492  (95%)  1,394  (89%)  1,454  (93%)  1,563
1993  1,504  (91%)  1,510  (91%)  1,529  (92%)  1,654
Source:  Dinas Perkebunan,  South  Sulawesi
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Comparison of Real Exchanee Rate Policies in
Maior Cocoa Producing Countries
The attached table and figure show the exchange rate indices of major cocoa
exporting countries adjusted by inflation, with 1980 as the base year.  The indices are
calculated by netting out CPI percentage change from the exchange rate percentage
change.'  These indices give good estimates of what one U.S. dollar has been worth
in these countries since 1980. For example, the figure of 1.29 in 1990 for Indonesia
implies that one U.S. dollar  in terms of purchasing power in 1990 was worth 1.29
times more as it was in 1980. On the other hand, one U.S. dollar in 1990 in Cote
d'Ivoire was worth US$0.80 in 1980 terms. The higher the index, the more
competitive a country is in production of exported commodities. The indices in the
table show that Indonesia's export sector has been much more competitive than other
producing countries such as Malaysia, Cote d'Ivoire, and Cameroon in the last 10
years, due mainly to the devaluation in the mid-1980s.
i  The formula  used  is ERI=(ERt,ERB)*(CPIB/CPIt)
where  ERt  = Exchange  rate in year t  CPIB  = Consumer  price index  in year t
ERB  = Exchange  rate in the base year  CPI,  = Consumer  price  index in the base
year
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Real Exchange  Index  Movements in Major Cocoa Production  Countries
300-
x
co  co  c-  CO  a*o  c  o  C  )  0  >  a




o  ~-  C'4  CO)  U  In  (.0  0  0)  0  '  C%J  CY) 
Co  Co  C  co  co  co  C  o  0  )  co  0o  co  0)  0)  CD
Year
-X-  Cote  d'lvoire  --  - Cameroon  ----  Indonesia  Malaysia  Nigeria
Note: Ghana was omitted due to a very large variabon.
Source: IECCP.
Real  Exchange  Index  Movements  in Major  Cocoa  Production  Countries
1980  1981  1982  1983  1984  1985  1986  1987  1988  1989  1990  1991  1992  1993  1994
C6ted'lvoire  1.00  1.18  1.33  1.46  1.60  1.62  1.17  0.95  0.88  0.93  0.80  0.82  0.74  0.77  n.a.
Cameroon  1.00  1.16  1.24  1.24  1.27  1.17  0.84  0.65  0.68  0.69  0.58  0.59  0.54  n.a.  n.a.
Ghana  1.00  0.46  0.38  0.54  1.59  2.17  2.86  3.53  3.54  3.77  3.32  3.17  3.42  4.07  4.77
Indonesia  1.00  0.90  0.86  1.06  1.08  1.11  1.22  1.43  1.35  1.34  1.29  1.25  1.21  1.14  1.08
Malaysia  1.00  0.96  0.92  0.89  0.86  0.91  0.94  0.91  0.93  0.93  0.91  0.88  0.78  0.76  0.75
Nigeria  1.00  0.94  0.95  0.83  0.63  0.68  1.26  2.60  1.90  2.05  2.08  2.27  2.74  2.23  1.60
Note: n.a. = not available.
Source:  IECCP.
42References
Akiyama, Takamasa and Donald Larson (1994),  "The Adding-Up Problem: Strategies for
Primary Commodity Exports in Sub-Saharan Africa," Policy Research Working
Paper No. 1245, The World Bank, Washington, D.C.
Akiyama, Takamasa and Pravin Trivedi (1987),  "Vintage Production Approach to
Perennial Crop Supply," Journal of Econometrics 36.
Bennett, Chris and Fadhil Hasan (1992),  "Exports of Low Quality Cocoa from Sulawesi,
Indonesia:  Market Failure or Market Evolution?" Center for Policy and
Implementation Studies (CPIS), Jakarta, Indonesia.
Bennett, Chris et. al. (1993),  "In the Name of Quality: Commodity Associations
Lobbying for Controls on Agricultural Trade" (unpublished).
Center for Agro-Socioeconomic Research (CASER), (1992). "Cassava Marketing in
Indonesia."
Direktorat Jenderal Perkebunan (Directorate General of Estates), Jakarta (1989),
"Statistik Perkebunan Indonesia or Statistics of Estate Crops in Tndonesia, 1984-89."
Direktorat Jenderal Perkebunan (Directorate General of Estates), Jakarta (1992),
"Statistik Perkebunan Indonesia--Statistics of Estate Crops in Indonesia, 1990-1992:
Cocoa."
Duncan, Alex and Stephen Jones (1993), "Agricultural Marketing and Pricing Reform: A
Review of Experiences," World Development, Vol. 21, No. 9.
Indranada, H. Tony K. (1993),  "Review of Cocoa Development in Indonesia,"
Theobroma, International Conference on Cocoa Economy, Bali, Indonesia, October
19-22, 1993, Guidebook.
Jamal, Sofyan and Marc Pomp (1993),  "Smallholder Adoption of Tree Crops: A Case
Study of Cocoa in Sulawesi," Bulletin of Indonesian Economic Studies, Vol. 29,
No. 3.
Regional Physical Planning Program for Transmigration (RePPProT) (1990),  "Land
Resources of Indonesia."
Ruf, Francois (1993a),  "Indonesia's Position Among Cocoa Producing Countries,"
Indonesian Circle (IC), No. 61, June 1993.
43Ruf, Francois (1993b), "Comparison of Cocoa Production Costs in Seven Producing
Countries,"  The Planter, Vol. 69, No. 807, June 1993.
Ruf, Francois (1993c),  "Competitivit6 et Cycles du Cacao: Vrais et Faux Problemes Sous
L'Eclairage Indonesien" (Competitiveness and Cocoa Cycles, Real and False
Problems from an Indonesian Angle),  Afrique -Asie: Performances Agricoles
Comparees, Revue Francaise d'Economie.
Shoup, Carl (1988),  "The Value Added Tax and Developing Countries,"  The World
Bank Research Observer, Vol. 3, No. 2, July 1988.
Schiff, Maurice and Alberto Valdez (1992), "The Political Economy of Agricultural
Pricing Policy, Volume 4," The John Hopkins University Press, Baltimore and
London.
Varangis, Panos, T. Akiyama and M.E. Thigpen (1990), "Recent Developments in
Marketing and Pricing Systems for Agricultural Export Commodities in Sub-Saharan
Africa," Policy Research Working Paper No. 431, The World Bank, Washington,
D.C.
Whitten, Anthony J., Mustafa Muslimin, and Gregory S. Henderson (1987),  "The
Ecology of Sulawesi,"  Gadjah Mada University Press.
World Bank (1990), "Indonesia: Sustainable Development of Forests, Land, and Water,"
Oxford University Press, New York.
World Bank (1994), "Indonesia: Environment and Development," A World Bank
Country Study, Washington, D.C.
World Bank (1995), "Commodity Markets and the Developing Countries," (quarterly),
Commodity Policy and Analysis Unit (IECCP), The World Bank, Washington, D.C.
44Policy Research Working Paper Series
Contact
Title  Author  Date  for paper
\AIPS1558 In Search of Price Rigidities  Jacques Morisset  December 1995  N. Cuellar
(Recent Sector Evidence from  37892
Argentina
WPS1559  Have Transport Costs Contributed  Azita Amjadi  December 1995  S. Lipscomb
to the Relative Decline of Sub-  Alexander J. Yeats  33718
Saharan African Exports? Some
Preliminary Empirical Evidence
WPS1  560 Trade and Fluctuations  Aart Kraay  December 1995  R. Martin
Jaume Ventura  39065
WPS1561  Income Inequality and Aggregate  Klaus Schmidt-Hebbel  January 1996  E. Khine
Saving: The Cross-Country Evidence  Luis Serv6n  37471
WPS1562  Catching Up with Eastern Europe?  Bernard Hoekman  January 1996  F. Hatab
The European Union's Mediterranean  Simeon Djankov  35835
Free Trade Initiative
WPS1563  Equity and Growth in Developing  Michael Bruno  January 1996  P. Sader
Countries: Old and New Pespectives  Martin Ravallion  33902
on the Policy Issues  Lyn Squire
WPS1564  From Plan to Market: Patterns of  Martha de Melo  January 1996  C. Rollison
Transition  Cevdet Denizer  84768
Alan Gelb
WPS1565  Housing Finance in Transition  Bertrand M. Renaud  January 1996  R. Garner
Economies: The Early Years in  37670
Eastern Europe and the Former
Soviet Union
WPS1566  Liquidity, Banks, and Markets:  Douglas W. Diamond  January 1996  D. Evans
Effects of Financial Development  38526
on Banks and the Maturity of
Financial Claims
WPS1567  Population Growth, Factor  Lant Pritchett  January 1996  S. Fallon
Accumulation, and Productivity  38009
WPS1568  Determinants of Diarrheal  Anna Alberini  January 1996  C. Bernardo
Disease in Jakarta  Gunnar S. Eskeland  37699
Alan Krupnick
Gordon McGranahan
WPS1569  Improving Water Resource  Rashid Faruqee  January 1996  C. Anbiah
Management in Bangladesh  Yusuf A. Choudhry  81275Policy Research Working Paper Series
Contact
Title  Author  Date  for paper
WPS1570  Protecting the Old and Promoting  Estelle James  January 1996  S. Khan
Growth: A Defense of Averting the  33651
Old Age Cnsis
WPS1571  Export Prospects of Middle Eastern  Alexander Yeats  February 1996  S. Lipscomb
Countries: A Post-Uruguay Round  33718
Analysis
WPS1572  Averting the Old-Age Crisis:  Robert J. Palacios  February 1996  M. Pallares
Technical Annex  30435
WPS1573  North-South Customs Unions and  Eduardo Fernandez-Arias  February 1996  S. King-Watson
International Capital Mobility  Mark M. Spiegel  31047
WPS1574  Bank Regulation: The Case of the  Gerard Caprio. Jr.  February 1996  D. Evans
Missing Model  38526
WPS1575  Inflation, Growth, and Central Banks:  Jose de Gregorio  February 1996  K. Labrie
Theory and Evidence  31001
WPS1576  Rural Poverty in Ecuador-A  Jesko Hentschel  February 1996  E. Rodriguez
Qualitative Assessment  WVilliam  F. Waters  37873
Anna Kathryn Vandever Webb
WPS1577  The Peace Dividend: Military  Malcolm Knight  February 1996  R. Martin
Spending Cuts and Economic  Norman Loayza  31320
Growth  Delano Villanueva
WPS1578  Stock Market and Investment:  Cherian Samuel  March 1996  C. Samuel
The Governance Role of the Market  30802
WPS1579  Different Strategies of Transition  Marek Dabrowski  March 1996  C. Rollison
to a Market Economy: How Do  84768
They Work in Practice?
WPS1580  Indonesia's Cocoa Boom: Hands-  Takamasa Akiyama  March 1996  G. Ilogon
Off Policy Encourages Smallholder  Akihiko Nishio  33732
Dynamism